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The Persistence of Informality: Evidence from Panel Data
* 
 
Informality is a growing phenomenon in the developing and transition country labor market 
context. In particular, it is noticeable that working in an informal employment relationship is 
often not temporary. The degree of persistence of informality in the labor market might be 
due to different sources: structural state dependence due to past informality experiences and 
spurious state dependence due to time-invariant unobserved individual effects, which can 
alter the propensity of being in the informal sector independently from actual informality 
experiences. The purpose of our paper is to study the dynamics of informality using a 
genuine panel data set in the Ukrainian labor market. By estimating a dynamic panel data 
probit model with endogenous initial conditions, we find a highly significant degree of 
persistence due to previous informality experiences. This result implies that policies 
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1. Introduction 
 
Informality in the labor market is a prevalent phenomenon in the developing, middle-
income and transition country context. A large proportion of the labor market 
participants  is considered to be working informally at one point in time or 
permanently in the sector. Subjective  data obtained  from informality surveys 
conducted by the World Bank (2007) highlight that the reasons and motivations for 
working and remaining in an informal employment relationship can be manifold and 
summarized as follows: institutional barriers, type of human capital, preferences, 
tastes, ability, wage differences and previous informality experiences among others.
1 
Some of these market or individual specific factors may lead the informality status of 
workers to be persistent over time. For instance, institutional barriers to enter into the 
formal sector such as registration costs or employers not wanting to register workers 
could be important for the persistence of informality status (De Soto, 1989). Lack or 
limited enforcement of registration or cumbersome rules and regulation may also 
provide incentives for employers to offer informal jobs leading workers to participate 
and remain in the informal sector for extended spells (De Soto, 1989; Kanbur, 2009).  
 
Individual human capital considerations may also be an important factor to enter and 
stay in the informal sector. For some individuals the informal sector serves as a 
training ground to gain skills in order to get a job in the formal sector in later years 
(Maloney, 2004). Contrary to this, it could also be that working in the informal 
                                                 
1 The degree to which these reasons and motivations are voluntary or involuntary for the informal 
sector participants is part of a large debate in the informality literature. For a summary of this debate 
see World Bank (2007).   3 
sector might be perceived as a low-skill task and a signal for low productivity, which 
renders the individual to be unsuccessful in future job searches in the formal sector.  
 
One  of the other reasons of persistence in the informality status may be due to 
different  valuation of the  benefits of social security system  by workers in the 
informal sector. Workers may be  myopic towards the future  and  not  value  the 
benefits of social security. Individuals might not find it beneficial to contribute to the 
social security system due to a history of non-contribution. This can occur when the 
cost to pay social security at present is higher, or at least perceived to be higher, than 
the benefits received in the future (Levy, 2008).  
 
These factors may characterize  the labor market and lead to persistence in the 
informality status once the individuals enter into the informal sector. The aim of this 
paper is to examine whether there is persistence in the informality status of workers 
in the Ukrainian labor market. Particularly, we aim to disentangle structural state 
dependence  which is caused by past informality  experiences  of workers from 
spurious state dependence which is caused by other sources of persistence such as 
time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics. Individuals might  have 
different  unobserved  motivations  and  preferences for flexible work hours and 
different valuations of the social security benefits (Maloney, 2004; Dohmen et al., 
2011).  Individuals  may also prefer specific tasks in a job which might only  be 
possible in an informal arrangement (Maloney, 2004; De Mel et al., 2010). Hence, 
these  unobserved characteristics  might  also  alter the propensity of being in the   4 
informal sector independently from actual informality experiences (Heckman, 1978, 
1981a, b). 
 
In order to assess the degree of persistence we estimate a dynamic random-effects 
probit model controlling for past informality experience, observed and unobserved 
individual characteristics. It is  also  very  important  to consider the  initial values 
problem in the estimation of such a model (Heckman, 1981a, b; Wooldridge, 2005). 
This problem occurs when the process generating the informality states is not 
observed from the beginning and the initial values could be endogenously 
determined by observed and unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics. It 
is crucial to deal with the endogenous initial values especially with a short panel 
dataset (as we have in this paper) to identify the structural state dependence. We deal 
with this problem using two existing methods, Heckman’s (1981a, b) reduced-form 
approximation and Wooldridge’s (2005) method. 
 
Our results can be summarized as follows: the parameter  of  past informality 
experience, i.e.  structural state dependence, is highly significant on the current 
informality status in the context of the Ukrainian labor market. Our analysis suggests 
that a failure to control for the endogenous initial values leads to a wrong inference: 
the models seriously overestimate the structural state dependence and also the 
variance of the unobserved individual effect is not identified. Controlling for the 
endogenous initial values generates lower estimates of structural state dependence 
and a sizeable variance of the unobserved individual effect. The models estimated   5 
here lead to nonlinear conditional expectations and thus we calculate the average 
partial effect of past informality experience for various important groups of interest. 
Our analysis suggests  that  a  past informality experience increases  the  current 
probability of being in the informal sector by 7-9 percentage points, ceteris paribus, 
compared to the workers who do not have previous informal sector experience. A 
detailed analysis suggests that the past informal sector experience is more 
pronounced on the current  informality status for young single males with low 
education.   
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the data source 
and descriptive statistics are presented. Section 3 introduces the dynamic random-
effects probit model and the two solution methods for the initial values problem, the 
Heckman’s (1981a, b) reduced-form approximation and the method of Wooldridge 
(2005). Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the robustness checks. 








   6 
2. Data 
 
2.1. The survey 
 
To understand the nature of informality over time we employ the Ukrainian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) for the years 2003, 2004 and 2007. The 
survey is nationally representative of the Ukrainian work force  and contains 
household and individual questionnaires.  The  household questionnaire elicits 
responses regarding income and expenditure patterns and living arrangements and 
conditions. The individual questionnaire contains detailed information on various 
individual characteristics and a large section on current and past labor market 
experiences.  
 
From this individual section we create our dependent variable, informality in the 
labor market: we focus on informal employment relationships and do not consider 
other measures of informality in our paper.
2  Informality in our data is defined 
according to non-registration of work contract while formal workers are registered. 
We generate our dependent variable using answers to the following question: Tell 
me, please, are you officially registered at this job, that is on a work roster, work 
agreement or contract? The answer to the question is either registered (formal) or 
not registered (informal). Therefore, our dependent variable is an indicator variable 
which takes the value 1 if the individual is an informal worker and 0 otherwise. The 
                                                 
2  This follows Kanbur (2009) who recommends the classification of informality according to a 
specific regulation.   7 
dataset includes  both  employees and self-employed  individuals  working  either 
formally or informally. However, we have restricted our analysis to an employee-
only sample as this provides the most clear-cut way to distinguish formal and 
informal employment structure in the labor market. 
 
In addition to data on registration, the ULMS allows us to exploit a rich set of 
explanatory variables  in our analysis. Age (from age 15 onwards),  gender 
(female/male dummy), marital status (married, single, divorced/separated/widowed), 
education levels (10 levels), total household income, sector of occupation (8 different 
sectors: agriculture, industry, sales, transportation, public administration, education, 
services and other sectors which include occupations not included in the previous 
categories) and regions (Kiev, Center, East, West, South) are the variables that we 
use in our empirical  analysis.  These variables  are  standard  in the literature on 
informality and have also  been employed in previous studies with the ULMS 
(Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007; Dohmen et al., 2011). One of the important limitations 
of the dataset is that the duration between waves is different. We include several 
history variables, which account for the time gap in the panel dataset between waves 
2004 and 2007.  These variables indicate whether individuals changed jobs, marital 
status or residence during that time period not covered by the main survey. We later 
use these variables to test the sensitivity of our results.  
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2.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
In Table 1 the descriptive statistics of the selected variables from the ULMS dataset 
are presented. The second column presents the statistics for the whole sample. The 
third and fourth columns relate to the characteristics of individuals split by informal 
and formal workers. Here, informal workers are counted as the ones that experience 
at least one spell of informality during the three waves. Formal workers are the 
number of observations relating to formal work experience, with no informality 
experience during the three waves of the ULMS. The last three columns of Table 1 
show the characteristics of individuals at a point in time of each wave, 2003, 2004, 
and 2007.  
 
About 4 percent of our sample is considered working in the informal sector as an 
employee at some point during the three waves while the remaining observations are 
entirely formal over this time period. Our sample is restricted only to formal and 
informal employees and also the data set is organized to be a balanced panel for our 
empirical analysis.
3  Thus, the mean informality rate is lower than the mean 
informality levels reported in the other studies using the same dataset (Lehmann and 
Pignatti, 2007). One important concern is that the attrition in the sample at use might 
be non-random relating to informality. We find that the informality dummy shows a 
                                                 
3 The mean informality rate in the non-restricted dataset is 0.13 (0.09 for 2003, 0.13 for 2004 and 0.15 
for 2007). We restrict the dataset only to employees by deleting the self-employed individuals. The 
mean informality rate then becomes 0.086 (0.06 for 2003, 0.10 for 2004 and 0.10 for 2007). We also 
delete individuals who are observed less than three waves and also the missing values in various 
variables. This would explain why our reported informality rates are lower compared to the literature 
(e.g., Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007)   9 
very stable pattern over time which is in line with informality patterns in the non-
restricted sample with self-employed individuals. The mean informality rates in our 
sample selection are 0.038, 0.044, and 0.040 for 2003, 2004 and 2007 respectively.  
 
The descriptive statistics for informal and formal workers are similar to the findings 
from the literature in the Ukrainian context using the same data set (Dohmen et al., 
2011). The characteristics of informal workers differ on several dimensions from 
workers who were in the formal sector over the three waves. Average age of the 
overall estimation sample is about 42 years while the informal workers are younger 
at about 35 years of age. Informal labor market participants are less likely to be 
married. More male workers are working in the informal sector. Education levels of 
informal sector workers are lower than education levels of formal sector participants. 
Looking at additional characteristics (history variables) for the period between 2004 
and 2007 we find that about 2 to 3 percent of individuals report to have changed 
residence or to have gotten married. About 20 percent report a job change during that 
period and this is larger for the ones who worked at some point in the informal sector 
during this time period.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In order to give an impression of the dynamics of informality states in the Ukrainian 
labor market, we present in Table 2 the run patterns of informality status using only 
the estimation sample. Here, (0, 0, 0) means that an individual is formally employed   10 
across the three waves. On the other hand, the triple (1, 1, 1) implies the individual is 
informally employed during the three waves  and this  indicates a high  degree of 
persistence. The other possibilities indicate lower levels of persistence to and from 
informality to formality or vice versa.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
3. Econometric framework  
 
3.1. The model 
 
In order to distinguish structural state dependence from other sources of persistence 
we specify a dynamic random-effects probit model by controlling for previous period 
informality status,  observed  and unobserved individual characteristics,  and 
endogenous initial values. The dynamic panel random-effects model is specified as: 
                          
                                              ( ) 0 1 , > + + = − it t i it it u d x d λ β 1 ,                                       (1) 
                                              it i it u ηε = +,                                                                  (2) 
                                              ( ) 0 1 1 1 1 > + = i i i u x d β 1                                                     (3) 
                       
where  it d   is a binary dependent  variable indicating whether an individual  i  is 
informally employed during the current period t (where  1,..., iI = and  3 , 2 , 1 = t );  it x is 
a vector of current socio-demographic and economic characteristics (such as   11 
education and marital status);  β is the corresponding vector of parameters to be 
estimated;  1 , − t i d  is an observed binary variable indicating whether an individual i 
was in the informal sector during the previous period ( 1 t − ); and the parameter λ  
represents the structural state dependence following Heckman (1981a, b).  
 
The error term in the model (1) and (3) has two components as displayed in (2). The 
first term  ( i η ) captures the time-invariant unobserved individual effects (such as 
motivation and ability). To control for these characteristics is crucial in order to be 
able to identify structural state dependence (λ ). The second term ( it ε ) is the usual 
error term, which is assumed to have a normal distribution with zero mean and unit 
variance due to the identification of a discrete choice model. The actual disturbance 
process is assumed to be serially uncorrelated. However, in this model controlling 
for unobserved individual effects  automatically  induces  a serial correlation. The 
correlation between two sequential error terms is,  1 / ) , (
2 2 + = η η σ σ is it u u Corr , 
( , 1,..., ; ) i ts Tt s = ≠ , where 
2
η σ  is the variance of unobserved individual effects to be 
estimated.  We follow a fully parameterized random-effects approach with a 
maximum likelihood  estimator. The log likelihood function that is used in the 
estimation process is as follows: 
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where  Φ  is the distribution function of standard normal random variable  and 
{ } 11 1 ( | ,)
T
i it i t fd η
= x  is the conditional distribution of initial values. The specification 
of this distribution is necessary in order to be able to identify structural state 
dependence.  
 
3.2. Initial values problem  
 
The likelihood function in (4) can be easily maximized using a Gaussian-Hermite 
quadrature when the conditional distribution of initial values  { } 11 1 ( | ,)
T
i it i t fd η
= x  is 
known. However, the distribution is unknown since the system given in (1)-(3) has 
started many periods before our sample panel dataset was observed. In this case the 
initial values would be endogenously determined with the evolution of parameters, 
observed and unobserved characteristics of individuals. In order to identify the 
structural state dependence and to disentangle it from other sources of persistence the 
initial values should be considered as endogenous with a probability distribution 
conditioned on observed and unobserved individual characteristics.  
 
There are two main methods for doing this: Heckman’s (1981a, b) reduced-form 
approximation and the Wooldridge’s (2005) method which is a simple alternative. 
Heckman’s method is based on available pre-sample information with which the 
conditional distribution of initial values is approximated via a reduced-form. This 
approximation allows a flexible specification of the relationships between initial   13 
values,  observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Wooldridge (2005) 
introduces  a simple alternative to Heckman’s reduced-form approximation. The 
method  suggests  that the unobserved individual effects  should  be considered 
conditional on initial values and the time-varying exogenous variables in a similar 
way to the correlated random-effects model of Chamberlain (1984).  
 
Recent studies suggest that there may be differences  in the magnitude of state 
dependence and the estimated variance  of unobserved individual effects  between 
these two methods,  especially  for very short panels (Arulampalam and Stewart, 
2009; Akay, 2011). Our sample size is small with T=3 and we use both methods to 
check for the sensitivity of the  results. We define the reduced-form which is 
employed in the Heckman’s method as follows,  
 
                                                 ( ) 0 1 1 1 > + = i i i u x d θ 1 ,                                                 (6) 
                                                 11 i ii u ψη ε = + ,                                                             (7) 
 
and the conditional distribution of the initial values is approximated as  
 
                                { } 11 1 1 1 ( | , ) (2 1)( )
T
i it i i i i t fd d x η η θ ψσ η
=  = Φ−+  x  .                       (8) 
 
We estimate the parametersβ ,θ , ψ  and  η σ  simultaneously by inserting (8) into the 
likelihood function (4) without imposing any restrictions (Heckman, 1981a, b; Hsiao, 
2003). The main assumption in this particular formulation of Heckman’s reduced-  14 
form approximation method is that the first period error term  1 i u  is correlated with 
the unobserved individual effects  i η  but it is uncorrelated with  it u  for 1 t > .  
 
For the Wooldridge method we first define an auxiliary distribution of unobserved 
individual effects as follows: 
 
                                                 0 1 21 i i ii xd ηππ π α = ++ + ,                                          (9) 
 








= ∑  is 
the within-means of time-variant exogenous variables and  i α  is the new unobserved 
individual effect  which is assumed to be normally distributed with 
[ ]
2
1 1 1 0 1 , ~ , | α σ π π π α i i i i i d x N d x + + . Inserting (9) into (4) generates a conditional 
likelihood which can be estimated as a standard random-effects probit model. This 
method is also very similar to the Chamberlain’s (1984) correlated-effects (quasi-
fixed-effects) model since the auxiliary distribution of unobserved individual effects 
includes  some of time-variant exogenous variables. We  only have limited 
information on the time-varying characteristics of the individuals. Moreover, we 
only have three waves and some time-varying variables such as education do not 
show enough variation in the sample across time. We mainly use age and income in 
the auxiliary distribution of unobserved individual effects given in (9). 
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4. Results 
 
Our main aim is to test whether there is significant structural state dependence on the 
probability of being employed in the informal sector. We first start with a standard 
static model in order to compare our results to  the previous literature.  We then 
extend our analysis to dynamic models in which we check the importance of 
endogenous initial values under the two different estimation methods. Finally, we 
test the robustness of our results.  
 
4.1. Main results  
 
We present the full set of parameter estimates from various model specifications in 
Table  3.  In each of these specifications the dependent variable  is the  current 
informality status and the models include previous period informality status together 
with various observed and unobserved individual characteristics. We first present a 
benchmark specification based on a static random-effects model, which is similar to 
models estimated in the previous literature (Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007; Dohmen et 
al., 2011; Arias and Khamis, 2008; World Bank, 2007). This allows us to validate the 
results from our dataset and to see whether our selection generates similar results 
compared to the literature. We  also examine whether time-invariant unobserved 
individual characteristics explain an important proportion of the variation in the 
probability of being employed in the informal sector. This specification is presented   16 
in the second column (Model I).
4 Most of the results are in line with the literature, 
which estimates the propensity of being in the informal sector in the Ukraine for the 
cross-section sample in 2007 or in 2003 and 2004 (Dohmen et al. 2011; Lehmann 
and Pignatti 2007). In particular, the results relating to household income, marital 
status, education and age exhibit similar patterns in our estimations compared to the 
results found in the literature (Dohmen et al., 2011; Lehmann and Pignatti 2007). 
The household income is negatively correlated with the probability of being in 
informal sector but it is not significant here. We find that the relationship between 
age and informality follows a U-shape, with a high propensity for informality during 
younger and older ages and a lower propensity for informality for the age cohorts in 
between. Marital status is significant and negatively correlated with the informal 
sector participation. Education tends to be a  highly  significant determinant of 
informality in the Ukraine. A higher number of years of education (higher education 
levels in our case)  is  negatively correlated with informality. Gender is  not  a 
significant determinant of informal sector participation in our initial model (Model 
I).  The results also suggest that unobserved individual characteristics explain an 
important part of the variation in the probability of being employed in the informal 
sector ( 52 . 0 = ρ ).  
 
Our main aim is to identify the structural state dependence and to disentangle it from 
other sources of persistence. Hence, we are mainly interested in the magnitude and 
                                                 
4 Note that all models estimated here are based on the assumption that the observed and unobserved 
characteristics are not orthogonal to each other. The correlation is controlled for using Chamberlain’s 
(1984) correlated-effects model (quasi-fixed-effects model).  
   17 
statistical significance of two  key parameters: the parameter of the  lagged 
informality status (λ ) and the variance of unobserved individual effects (
2
α σ ). In the 
third column of Table 3, we present the estimation results obtained by using the 
exogenous initial values assumption (Model II). This specification implies that the 
first period state of being in the informal sector is exogenous (not a function of 
individual observed and unobserved characteristics) which is not a very plausible 
assumption itself. The parameter of lagged informality status, i.e., structural state 
dependence, is estimated by the exogenous initial values assumption to be around 
1.40 (Table 3, Model II) and it is highly significant. However, it is important to note 
that the variance of unobserved individual effect is not identified and it is estimated 
as zero, which is not expected given the large variance found in the case of the static 
random-effects model (Model I).  
 
In the fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 we present results which control for the 
endogenous initial values using the Wooldridge’s and Heckman’s methods (Model 
III and IV). The Wooldridge’s method is a simple way to deal with the initial values 
problem in the dynamic probit models with random effects. However,  it  may 
generate bias for panels of very short durations (Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009; 
Akay, 2011). We also do not have many time-variant characteristics to specify a 
flexible conditional distribution for the unobserved individual effects.  The estimated 
parameter of lagged dependent variable is reduced to 0.84 which is almost half of the 
size of the parameter generated with the assumption of exogenous initial values.   18 
However, as before the variance of unobserved individual effect is not identified and 
estimated to be very close to zero.  
 
The preferred method in this paper to deal with the initial values problem is the 
Heckman’s reduced-form approximation given the available sample characteristics 
and the duration of the panel dataset. Since we do not have additional pre-sample 
information of individuals, we follow the suggestions of Heckman (1981a, b) to use 
the first wave in the reduced-form equation (6). The characteristics we include are 
age, education, marital status,  regions  and income. The estimated parameter of 
lagged informality status is highly significant and estimated as 0.80, which is even 
smaller compared to the Wooldridge method. An important result is that the variance 
of the unobserved individual effect is identified and estimated as 0.49. This reflects a 
large variance for the heterogeneity distribution among informal sector workers in 
Ukraine. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
4.2. Average partial effects  
 
The results reported in Table 3 suggest that there is a highly significant structural 
state dependence of informality. However, the models estimated in this paper have 
nonlinear conditional expectations and the ceteris paribus  interpretation is only 
possible using the partial (marginal) effect of a variable. There are various ways of   19 
calculating partial effects. The nonlinearity inherent in the dynamic random-effects 
probit specification allows us to calculate the partial effects for each individual. The 
individual partial effects of lagged dependent variable  1 , − t i d  can then be calculated 
using the conditional expectation of the probit model:
5 
                          
                     ( ) ( ) ( ) ) 0 ( ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 , 1 , 1 ,
1 , = + Φ − = + Φ = − − −
−
t i it t i it t i it
d
it d x d x d m λ β λ β x ,         (10) 
 
where  it m ˆ  is the partial effect function; Φ is the cumulative distribution function of 
standard normal random variable; and β ˆ  and  λ ˆ are the estimated parameters. A 
consistent estimator of the population average partial effect (ape) can be calculated 
by simply averaging each individual-time partial effects in the observed sample:
6  
 

















1 , , ˆ 1
) , ( x x .                         (11)  
 
We present the estimated ape and their population averaged standard errors in Table 
4. The ape generated by the model which assumes exogenous initial values is 0.20 
which implies that previous period informality status increases the probability of 
being in the informal sector in the current period by 20 percentage points. It is large 
and highly significant as expected. The estimated ape of structural state dependence 
                                                 
5 We calculate the standard errors of the partial effects using the delta method.  
6 One of the other alternatives is to integrate the partial effect function over the unobserved individual 
effects using Monte Carlo integration methods. In this paper we assume that the effect of unobserved 
individual effect can be ignored after averaging the partial effects for the whole population (see 
Wooldridge, 2005).   20 
is substantially reduced once we control for the endogenous initial values.   The 
average partial effect of lagged informality status on the current informality status is 
around 7-9 percentage point, ceteris paribus.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
In the second part of Table 4, we sort individual partial effects by  using  socio-
demographic characteristics such as gender and marital status and estimate the ape of 
lagged informality in each case. The estimated ape is significant in most cases and 
varies in size. It is clearly larger for males. We generate two dummy variables to 
indicate low educated (less than education level 7) and high educated individuals 
(education level 7 or higher). The estimated ape of lagged informality status is much 
larger among low educated individuals. We also sort individuals by marital status 
and calculate the  ape  of lagged  informality status. It is larger for single people 
compared to married or divorced/separated/widowed individuals. One of the 
important finding is that the ape of lagged informality status is larger for young 
people and it gradually is reduced by age. We  also find  that  the  ape  of lagged 
informality status differs by sectors. As we would expect, it is not significant for the 
public administration and education sectors. However, it is substantially larger for 
the sale and service sectors.  
 
 
   21 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
Alternative specifications - The dynamic probit model with random effects relies on 
strict parametric assumptions for the auxiliary distribution of unobserved individual 
effects and initial values. To check the sensitivity of previous results with respect to 
these assumptions, we estimate a dynamic linear probability model using a GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) estimator with first-differences  (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). This specification provides a  semi-parametric identification  of the 
model parameters by eliminating the unobserved individual effects and initial values 
problem (Stewart, 2007; Alessie et al., 2004). The full estimation results of the first-
difference GMM estimator are presented in the second column of Table 5 (Model I).
7 
In this specification we use the same set of independent variables as before. 
However, due to first-differences the time-invariant variables are swept away and the 
number of observations  in the final  estimation sample is also  reduced.  We 
experiment with various alternative sets of instruments including the initial 
informality status  1 i d  as one of the instrument (Stewart, 2007). Table 5 reports the p-
value of the overidentifying restrictions based on the Sargan test. The result suggests 
that the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at any conventional significance 
level (p-value=0.979). This specification generates linear conditional expectations 
and the estimated parameters directly correspond to the average partial effects. The 
ape of state dependence is around 0.36 which is larger than the results reported 
above. However, it is positive and highly significant, which is in  line with the 
                                                 
7 We have estimated also a system-GMM specification and found similar results (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). The results can be provided from authors upon request.    22 
previous results. This result also confirms that there is a substantial structural state 
dependence on the informality status of workers in Ukraine. 
  
Unequal durations between periods - We only have three years of panel data and 
these were collected in the years 2003, 2004 and 2007. The time duration for 2003-
2004 and 2004-2007 differs. This may bias the estimated parameter of structural 
state dependence. In order to deal with this issue we use a history module covered by 
the 2007 questionnaire about events that take place between 2004 and 2007. To test 
the sensitivity of previous results we estimate models using three indicator variables 
for any job, marital status and residential changes that occurred between 2004 and 
2007. We then compare the magnitude of the structural state dependence and the 
variance of unobserved individual effects. The results are presented in the third, 
fourth  and  fifth  columns of Table  5  (Models II-IV).  We find  that the estimated 
parameters are almost the same as before. However, the estimated structural state 
dependence is slightly reduced (except Heckman’s reduced-form approximation 
specification). In order to check the sensitivity of the results further we calculate the 
ape as previously reported. These results are presented in Table 6 for the whole 
sample and for some groups of interest. The estimated ape  is slightly lower 
compared to Table 4 but the main results remain stable.  
 
Table 5 about here 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper  is to examine  the  dynamics of informality  in the 
Ukrainian labor market.  We attempt to identify  persistence  or structural state 
dependence  due to past  informality experience and to  disentangle it from other 
sources such as the persistence due to unobserved time-invariant  individual 
characteristics. To address this issue we estimate a dynamic panel data random-
effects model with endogenous initial values and quasi-fixed-effects specification 
based on three waves of genuine panel data on informality.  
 
The model which assumes initial informality status of individuals in the labor market 
to be exogenous substantially overestimates the persistence due to past participation 
in the informal sector. This assumption leads to zero variance for the unobserved 
influences on informality  status.  Once, we account for endogenous initial values 
using Heckman’s reduced-form approximation, we find a significant degree of 
heterogeneity among the individuals in our sample and a lower degree of persistence 
due to past informality experience. We calculated individual partial effects for the 
whole population and for various subgroups and find that the effect of past 
informality experience on the current informality status is highly significant leading 
to 7-9 percentage points larger probability to be employed in the informal sector, 
ceteris paribus. The effect of the past informality experience is more pronounced for 
young single and less educated males.  
   24 
One of the limitations of this study is the short time dimension of the panel dataset. 
This dataset, according to our knowledge, is one of the few genuine panel data, 
which make it possible to study the dynamics of informality in the developing and 
transition country contexts. However,  we cannot assess the precise nature of 
structural state dependence because the size of the sample reduces substantially when 
we consider the information on the reasons for being in the informal sector (e.g. 
whether non-registration is voluntary or involuntary, following Dohmen et al., 2011). 
We also have not included transitions to and from unemployment or inactivity. With 
these limitations in mind our results still provide significant insights into the nature 
of informality over time and the persistence of informality in the labor market in a 
transition country. Hence, current informality experience of an individual seems to 
have future effects on the individual’s labor market participation in the informal 
sector. Our results suggest that policies attempting to reduce  current levels of 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics                
   Whole sample   Informal Workers  Formal Workers  2003  2004  2007 
Informal dummy  0.041  …  …  0.038  0.044  0.040 
  (0.198)  …  …  (0.192)  (0.206)  (0.196) 
Log(household income)  6.797  6.795  6.797  6.237  6.627  7.528 
  (0.989)  (0.863)  (1.000)  (0.793)  (0.619)  (1.023) 
Married  0.704  0.559  0.717  0.701  0.687  0.725 
  (0.456)  (0.497)  (0.450)  (0.458)  (0.464)  (0.447) 
Single  0.130  0.265  0.118  0.148  0.136  0.106 
  (0.336)  (0.442)  (0.323)  (0.356)  (0.342)  (0.308) 
Divorced/Separated/Widowed  0.166  0.176  0.165  0.151  0.178  0.169 
  (0.372)  (0.381)  (0.371)  (0.358)  (0.382)  (0.375) 
Female  0.527  0.426  0.536  0.527  0.526  0.526 
  (0.499)  (0.495)  (0.499)  (0.499)  (0.499)  (0.499) 
Male  0.473  0.574  0.464  0.473  0.474  0.474 
  (0.499)  (0.495)  (0.499)  (0.499)  (0.499)  (0.499) 
Education level  6.554  5.481  6.649  6.320  6.609  6.733 
  (1.829)  (1.860)  (1.796)  (1.969)  (1.771)  (1.714) 
Age  42.429  35.972  43.001  40.755  41.774  44.758 
  (10.743)  (10.028)  (10.617)  (10.606)  (10.619)  (10.605) 
Regions             
Kiev  0.052  0.046  0.052  0.052  0.052  0.052 
  (0.222)  (0.210)  (0.223)  (0.222)  (0.222)  (0.222) 
Center  0.242  0.167  0.248  0.242  0.242  0.242 
  (0.428)  (0.373)  (0.432)  (0.428)  (0.428)  (0.428) 
West  0.152  0.093  0.157  0.152  0.152  0.152 
  (0.359)  (0.290)  (0.364)  (0.359)  (0.359)  (0.359) 
East  0.308  0.343  0.305  0.308  0.308  0.308 
  (0.462)  (0.475)  (0.460)  (0.462)  (0.462)  (0.462) 
South  0.246  0.352  0.237  0.246  0.246  0.246 
  (0.431)  (0.478)  (0.425)  (0.431)  (0.431)  (0.431)   28 
Sectors             
Agriculture  0.080  0.102  0.078  0.084  0.089  0.066 
  (0.271)  (0.303)  (0.268)  (0.278)  (0.285)  (0.248) 
Industry  0.257  0.204  0.262  0.259  0.262  0.251 
  (0.437)  (0.403)  (0.440)  (0.438)  (0.440)  (0.434) 
Sales  0.078  0.321  0.057  0.081  0.073  0.081 
  (0.268)  (0.468)  (0.231)  (0.272)  (0.260)  (0.272) 
Transportation  0.102  0.068  0.105  0.098  0.106  0.102 
  (0.303)  (0.252)  (0.306)  (0.297)  (0.308)  (0.302) 
Public Administration  0.047  0.015  0.050  0.042  0.048  0.051 
  (0.212)  (0.123)  (0.218)  (0.201)  (0.214)  (0.220) 
Education  0.265  0.037  0.285  0.269  0.262  0.264 
  (0.441)  (0.189)  (0.451)  (0.444)  (0.440)  (0.441) 
Services  0.064  0.114  0.059  0.067  0.061  0.063 
  (0.244)  (0.319)  (0.236)  (0.250)  (0.239)  (0.244) 
Other  0.107  0.139  0.105  0.100  0.099  0.123 
  (0.310)  (0.346)  (0.306)  (0.300)  (0.298)  (0.329) 
History 2004-2007             
Job leavers  0.187  0.565  0.153  …  …  … 
  (0.390)  (0.497)  (0.360)  …  …  … 
Marital status change  0.025  0.028  0.025  …  …  … 
  (0.156)  (0.165)  (0.155)  …  …  … 
Residential change   0.030  0.046  0.029  …  …  … 
  (0.171)  (0.210)  (0.167)  …  …  … 
#Observations  3984  324  3660  1328  1328  1328 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Source: Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (2003, 2004 and 2007).   29 
Table 2. Run patterns of informality in Ukraine 
Run patterns  #Observations  Percent% 
2003  2004  2007     
         
0  0  0  3660  91.87 
0  0  1  78  1.96 
0  1  0  66  1.66 
0  1  1  27  0.68 
1  0  0  51  1.28 
1  0  1  18  0.45 
1  1  0  48  1.20 
1  1  1  36  0.90 
      3984   
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Table 3. Main results 
  I  II  III  IV 
Variables 
The Static probit model  
(Correlated 
random-effects model) 
The dynamic probit 
model 
(correlated random- 
effects and  exogenous 
initial values) 
The dynamic probit model 
(Wooldridge method) 
The dynamic probit 
model 
(Heckman’s method with 
correlated random- effects ) 






















































































South=1  0.648**  0.625**  0.750**  0.767*** 
  (0.390)  (0.318)  (0.338)  (0.232) 
Nuisance parameters         
         
Wooldridge’s method  
Initial period informality  
…  …  0.819*** 
(0.217) 
… 
Mean(household income)  0.085  -0.048  -0.072  -0.049   31 
(0.182)  (0.139)  (0.140)  (0.104) 








Mean(age-squared)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Heckman’s method Reduced-form 
equation  
       
         
Age  …  …  …  -0.057*** 
(0.013) 
Log-household income  …  …  …  0.122*** 
(0.049) 
Education  …  …  …  -0.201*** 
(0.062) 
Married  …  …  …  -0.760*** 
(0.235) 
Single  …  …  …  -0.583** 
(0.277) 
Center  …  …  …  -0.547** 
(0.242) 
West  …  …  …  -1.067*** 
(0.259) 
East  …  …  …  -0.352** 
(0.196) 
South  …  …  …  -0.132 
(0.154) 
Constant  …  …  …  0.057 
(0.069) 
ψ   …  …  …  3.447*** 
(0.488) 
         








#Observations  3984  2656  2656  2656 
Wald chi-squared test (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log-likelihood  -471.87  -307.77  -300.78  -494.31   32 
Sector dummies (7 dummies)  yes  yes  yes  yes 
         
Note: We use 30 quadrature points in Gauss-Hermite quadrature for the integrals in likelihood functions. [***], [**], [*] indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table 4. Average partial effects of lagged informality status    
           
Average partial effect of lagged 






method  #obs 
Whole sample  0.204  ***  0.088  **  0.067  *  3984 
   (0.064)     (0.044)     (0.036)       
Sorting by socio-demographics               
Females  0.169  ***  0.069  *  0.050  *  2098 
  (0.059)    (0.036)    (0.029)     
Males  0.242  ***  0.109  **  0.085  *  1886 
  (0.070)    (0.052)    (0.044)     
Low educated  0.273  ***  0.125  **  0.100  **  1910 
  (0.074)    (0.057)    (0.050)     
High educated  0.140  **  0.054  *  0.036    2074 
  (0.055)    (0.031)    (0.024)     
Married  0.193  ***  0.082  *  0.060  *  2806 
  (0.063)    (0.042)    (0.035)     
Single  0.288  ***  0.136  **  0.115  **  518 
  (0.076)    (0.061)    (0.050)     
Divorced/Separated/Widowed  0.182  ***  0.077  **  0.058  *  660 
  (0.060)    (0.038)    (0.032)     
Age<35  0.285  ***  0.132  **  0.112  **  1002 
  (0.074)    (0.059)    (0.050)     
Age>35 and Age<50  0.211  ***  0.090  **  0.066  *  1905 
  (0.066)    (0.045)    (0.038)     
Age>50  0.115  **  0.043  *  0.027    1077 
  (0.050)    (0.027)    (0.021)     
Sorting by sectors               
Industry  0.186  ***  0.073  *  0.052  *  1025 
  (0.062)    (0.039)    (0.032)     
Sales  0.420  ***  0.224  ***  0.182  **  311 
  (0.071)    (0.079)    (0.074)     
Transportation  0.220  ***  0.090  *  0.067  *  406 
  (0.076)    (0.050)    (0.041)     
Public Administration  0.132    0.049    0.033    188 
  (0.084)    (0.042)    (0.030)     
Education  0.067  *  0.019    0.011    1055 
  (0.040)    (0.017)    (0.010)     
Services  0.355  ***  0.169  **  0.139  **  254 
  (0.082)    (0.073)    (0.065)     
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Table 5: Alternative estimators and the effect of unequal durations between periods in the panel dataset 
  Dynamic Linear  
Probability Model 
Dynamic Probit Random-Effects  
Model with History Variables 
  I  II  III  IV 
Variables 

















Wooldridge’s method  
Initial period informality 
… 
 
…  0.897*** 
(0.218) 
… 























































































(0.368)   35 












         
Sargan test (p-value)  0.979  …  …  … 






#Observations  1328   2656  2656  2656 
Wald chi-squared test (p-value)   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Log-likelihood  …  401.84  703.66  700.71 
Sector dummies (7 dummies)  yes  yes  yes  Yes 
         
Note: We use 30 quadrature points in Gauss-Hermite quadrature for the integrals in likelihood functions. [***], [**], [*] indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10, respectively. The last three models (II, III, and IV) are specified using Chamberlain approach for the unobserved individual effects. Nuisance parameters are not 
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Table 6. Sensitivity analysis: average partial effects     
           
Average partial effect of lagged 






method  #obs 
Whole sample  0.176  ***  0.071  *  0.070  *  3984 
   (0.060)     (0.037)     (0.036)       
Sorting by socio-demographics               
Females  0.145  ***  0.056  *  0.054  *  2098 
  (0.054)    (0.030)    (0.029)     
Males  0.210  ***  0.088  **  0.088  **  1886 
  (0.067)    (0.044)    (0.044)     
Low educated  0.240  ***  0.103  **  0.104  **  1910 
  (0.071)    (0.050)    (0.049)     
High educated  0.117  **  0.041  *  0.039  *  2074 
  (0.049)    (0.025)    (0.024)     
Married  0.167  ***  0.066  *  0.064  *  2806 
  (0.058)    (0.035)    (0.034)     
Single  0.246  ***  0.111  **  0.116  **  518 
  (0.072)    (0.051)    (0.053)     
Divorced/Separated/Widowed  0.159  ***  0.063  *  0.062  **  660 
  (0.055)    (0.032)    (0.031)     
Age<35  0.250  ***  0.111  **  0.117  **  1002 
  (0.072)    (0.051)    (0.054)     
Age>35 and Age<50  0.180  ***  0.071  *  0.068  *  1905 
  (0.061)    (0.037)    (0.037)     
Age>50  0.100  **  0.035    0.031  *  1077 
   (0.046)     (0.023)     (0.018)       
Note: [***], [**], [*] indicate significance levels at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 